Mission
Statement |
Anti-Americanism? No, Democracy!Katharine H.S. Moon Hurt pride? Nationalism? Generational Change? Aversion to American arrogance? These are the usual explanations for the recent explosion of "anti-American" protests in South Korea. But hurt pride alone cannot mobilize 300,000 citizens to raise their public voice, as Koreans did this past weekend. Justice for the two Korean girls who were run over and killed by the armored vehicle that the soldiers were driving has been pitted against the legitimacy of the U.S.-Korea Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), but the larger conflict is between Korean democracy and U.S. interests on the peninsula. The demonstrations over the acquittal of the two U.S. servicemen are a result of a decade of intense democratization in South Korea. Since 1987, new laws to promote civil rights, autonomy for local governments, and governmental transparency and accountability have proliferated. Citizen activism has been vigorous on a wide range of issues, in the streets and in courts and legislative bodies. Koreans not only have sued their government for personal damages stemming from U.S. military activities, but also have pressed for the right to resist the national draft. Such a show of citizen power and exercise of rights through the institutions of law and government was unimaginable prior to the nineties. Criticism of U.S. policies and officials should not be equated with outright opposition to and hatred of the United States. Many Korean activists distinguish between the Korean term bi-mi, which means "critical of the U.S.," and ban-mi, which means "anti-U.S." The majority identifies with the former. But political observers and the media in both countries continue to use the misnomer of "anti-Americanism" to describe recent tensions, thereby contributing to a sense of alarm and confusion. They overlook the fact that critics of the U.S. are diverse, with disagreements over priorities (e.g., environmental neglect, mistreatment of Korean women by U.S. troops), goals, and methods. For fifty years, Korean frustration and tensions with the U.S. have grown in the shadows of the feelings of gratitude and friendship for American military and economic largesse. This is not news to most Koreans, for memories of American soldiers in the 1950s and 1960s calling them "gook," "shorty," or stiffing a cabdriver have been passed down through generations, and many local residents have endured decades of disruptions caused by military exercises. Even recent draftees to the Korean army criticize the U.S. for leaving them run-down training facilities and treating them like second-class soldiers. Citizens have complained among themselves, but for most of the fifty years of the U.S. troop presence, authoritarian leaders backed by the Korean military allowed no room for public complaints. They made their handpicked local officials keep a lid on public dissent. But throughout the 1990s, Koreans living near the U.S. bases have been pressing local officials to improve the general quality of life. In an unprecedented show of power, local governments that house the bases have banded together since 2000 to demand from the central government compensation and recognition for bearing the lion's share of the economic, environmental, and social burdens of the U.S. presence. The crux of the democratic dilemma is this: The exercise of new rights and freedoms generally stops at the gates of the U.S. military compound. Most U.S. military activities are beyond the purview of Korean democracy because they are governed by the SOFA. This creates intense frustration for Korea's new democrats. Rather than scratch our heads or express annoyance or "hurt" at the criticism voiced by our longtime ally, Americans need to recognize and adjust to these fundamental transformations in the Korean political system and society. Americans and Koreans also need to educate one another about the role and meaning of the SOFA for each country. Revising jurisdictional provisions may help improve relations with Korea in the short run, but long-term improvements require attention to the operational aspects of the SOFA from top to bottom. At the local level, improving knowledge about the SOFA, language skills, and channels of communication among local Korean and U.S. officials are key to observing the SOFA and preventing politicization of simple incidents. Koreans near the bases feel that for every one grievance that comes to public light, there are tens or hundreds that do not because local Korean officials are not confident with their English skills to interrogate GIs or deal with the legalese of the SOFA; mediation is slow and cumbersome. Koreans and Americans need to avoid lazy interpretations and short-term political exploitation of recent tensions. Explaining recent tensions as an expression of Koreans' "hurt pride," as Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage has done, is not a useful framework for understanding the problems or solutions that go beyond nationalistic sentiment. Public criticism of the U.S. by Korean activists started in the early 1990s, before the George W. Bush and Kim Dae Jung administrations came to power. And a new Korean president, conservative or radical, will not be able to satisfy the Korean public or the U.S. government on issues that history and democracy have delivered. American and Korean officials must forgo status quo notions and standard operating procedures of an alliance that is fifty years old and catch up to the scope and pace of a hyperactive democracy in South Korea. |
