Mission
Statement |
Over-Americanization of Korea and Under-Koreanization of AmericaKatharine H.S. Moon As a Korean-American growing up in the United States, I have experienced personally the changes from pro-American to anti-American sentiments in Korea. In the late 1970s, when I was about 15 or 16 years old, I was aware that my U.S. passport was like a gold ticket in Korea, welcome in many places. I knew this was a strange kind of power and privilege for a child to have. Several years later in 1985, I learned that the same passport was no longer a gold ticket but rather a problem. Together with Korean friends, I would travel, and when we had to present our identification, I would offer my passport because that is all I had. When I showed my passport to the security guard or the person in uniform, they turned very cold and hard and asked me lots of questions. I was a young university student at that time, visiting Korea during summer vacation to travel with my father to learn about Korea's mountains, Buddhist temples, and history. But the biggest history lesson I learned was that something was changing dramatically in Korea-US relations. In recent years, anti-American sentiments have become quite widespread in Korean society. The degree and intensity of those feelings differ, of course, from person to person. But from teenagers to government officials, there is growing skepticism about U.S. friendship toward Korea and impatience about the historical role of "younger brother" that Korea has played in the alliance. To a great extent, critical views of Korea-US relations reflect democratization processes at work in Korea. In contrast to the period of dictatorship and authoritarianism, Koreans can voice their opinions on foreign policy and national security and criticize the presence and role of U.S. troops without fearing the National Security Law and government repression. And NGOs can now work openly with one another and with elected officials to channel their political concerns into public policy issues. Scholars who study the development of democracy view such processes as positive and necessary. Although there are numerous ways to explain the spread of anti-American sentiments in Korean society, I focus on two points: "over-Americanization of Korea" and "under-Koreanization of America." Koreans are over-exposed to America and American influences. Perhaps most of the world experiences some form of Americanization, whether it is through military power or the power of Hollywood. But modern Korean history and existence have such intimate, personal ties to the U.S., from the American education and political influences on Syngman Rhee to the U.S. role in the Korean War, the 100,000 Korean children who were adopted by Americans, the hundreds of thousands of Korean women who have provided sexual "service" to U.S. GIs, the wide variety of American consumer items for sale, the generations of Korean elites who have gained intellectual and technological expertise from American universities, to the younger generation of children who now attend English-language kindergartens even before they have learned Korean language. In some ways, it is this long personalized history and relationship with America, and not just U.S. policies, that make Koreans so frustrated with America. The question of "Who are we apart from, or distinct from, America? Who can we become?" seems to be at the root of much of the anti-American feelings. Here, I want to point out that anti-American sentiments are not solely reflections of Korea's relationship with the U.S. and the U.S. role in Korea. They are also about Korean sentiments toward other Koreans. In a severely competitive society like Korea, English serves as the arbiter of success and upward class mobility. High school and university students complain bitterly about how stressful and difficult it is to learn English-I think they are not simply saying that it is technically difficult to learn English but rather that it is difficult because their educational and professional survival is often determined by English. But who is judging young people's survival? It is not Americans, but Koreans. Korean elites have set English and Americanization as requirements for success. And this kind of social pressure reaches even small children, teaching them at a young age that failure or success, social marginalization or acceptability, all depend on American English. There is a painful scene in one of the first episodes of the drama Wigi-ui Namja, where elementary school children create power and misery for one another by showing off who speaks better American English and who owns the "better" English books. It is a fitting commentary on the process of Americanization created within Korean society. By contrast, Americans are "under-Koreanized." For most Americans, the most important and prominent historical and mental image of Korea remains the Korean War. Many veterans of that war, who sacrificed their lives and youths, rightfully feel hurt and angered when they learn of anti-American protests in Korea. But Americans need to catch up on Korean history and development. For the average American, the word "Korea" brings up images of war and poverty, the TV show M*A*S*H, riot police on TV screens, Hyundai cars, and "evil," nuclear North Korea. Since June, 2002, the World Cup is by far the most positive image on that list. But the problem with such TV frame notions of Korea is the absence of the process by which Korea has changed dramatically in fifty years and the time, effort, trial-and-error starts and stops through which Koreans have moved from hardship and powerlessness in the 1950s to semi-final status as a co-host of a major international sporting and cultural event in the early 2000s. For most Koreans, the Korean War is part of history books, but the history has moved on. For most Americans, the war is frozen in time and continues to color their views of Korea. The reality of politics makes this so-Korea is only one of many countries in the world that the U.S. is concerned with, and it is not a priority country except for nuclear issues regarding the North and the continued presence of U.S. troops. Most policymakers in Washington, D.C. who work on Korea are concerned mainly with those issues. It is not only policymakers that need to take more responsibility for what they do not know about Korea; American educators also need to share that responsibility. School text books from elementary school on have a profound influence on how we see and not see the world. Korea is usually "not seen." And again, when it is taught in school, the Korean War is the primary, and usually, the only lesson, and of course, viewed through American lenses. Even at top universities, the situation is not very different. Only a very small number of universities and liberal arts colleges offer Korean language and courses on Korea in their curriculum. And even when students, particularly Korean-American students, demand and lobby for Korean language programs, university administrations often resist because they assume that only Korean-Americans and not other Americans would be interested in taking such courses. It is sometimes very ironic because in many places, only a very small number of students will take Latin or German or Hebrew, whereas many more would be interested in studying Korean. And yet, universities and colleges continue to fund Latin and German programs but refuse to consider Korean programs. In some ways, Americans interested in Korean studies and language face the opposite problem that Koreans who study America and English face. In the U.S., studying Korea and Korean language generally does not bring great rewards. By contrast, in Korea, studying America and English bring great professional rewards. Over time, these gaps in education, cultural knowledge, and psychological affinity can grow and intensify misinformation, misunderstanding and mistrust in political relations. Koreans and Americans need to think more deeply about the social bases of Americanization, anti-Americanism, and under-Koreanization and work together to bridge these gaps. The political future of Korean-American relations may depend on it. |
