Mission
Statement |
Defusing the North Korean Nuclear CrisisPeter M. Beck Dong-a Ilbo, June 19, 2003 How can we resolve the world's nuclear concerns about North Korea while at the same time avoid a calamity on the Korean Peninsula? Despite a flurry of diplomatic activity in recent weeks, the nuclear crisis continues to deepen. Meanwhile, Washington and Seoul are grappling with conflicting approaches to the North. Last weekend featured the juxtaposition of Seoul attempting to throw the North an economic life preserver by reconnecting the severed railway line, while Washington is trying to drown the North through greater economic isolation. The Trilateral Cooperation and Oversight Group meetings in Hawaii last week appear to be the latest attempt to paper over differences. The Roh Administration is confronted with a dilemma: Pyongyang cannot be trusted, but how much more reliable is the United States? Critics of President Roh who suggest that he lacks consistency in his dealings with America and North Korea not only fail to grasp the gravity of the situation but also suffer from historical amnesia. Have we already forgotten the last President Roh's nickname, "Mul (water) Tae-woo" or Kim Young-sam's naengtang ontang (hot-cold) approach toward North Korea? Even the resolute Kim Dae-jung, as presidential candidate had very different views of the IMF than after he became president. It is equally unrealistic to think that any Korean government can change the Bush Administration's approach or decisions. As one Korea watcher in government put it to me, "When you have an ideology, you don't need specialists." With an ideological commitment that borders on religious fervor, if the hawks refuse to listen to the Secretary of State or lean on their own analysts to reach the conclusion they are looking for (as several CIA analysts are claiming on Iraq), why would the hawks listen to a foreign ambassador or even head of state? The Department of Defense unilaterally decided to remove U.S. forces from the DMZ as soon as possible. Yet, other agencies and many officials who managed the 1994 crisis are puzzled by the Pentagon's decision given the deepening crisis. Why wasn't the move at least used as a bargaining chip with North Korea? The decision sends precisely the wrong signal to both Koreas. The Bush Administration's insistence that it seeks a "peaceful diplomatic solution" to the crisis rings increasingly hollow. Washington has held a total of two official meetings with the North in the past 30 months and both were acrimonious. Divisions over how to deal with North Korea persist within the Bush Administration, leading to the widespread perception that the administration's North Korea policy is incoherent or nonexistent. To date, the policy can be characterized by three C's: pursuing confrontation with the North, demanding the North's capitulation rather than reaching a compromise (which for hawks would constitute "blackmail"), and quietly waiting for the North to collapse. The Administration has so far refused to test the North's intentions, claiming that this was tried in 1994 and failed. Since the revelations about the North's clandestine uranium enrichment program last October, there has been a profound shift to the right in the views of North Korea in Washington. There is a growing sense of frustration and recognition that forging a multilateral coalition is the only way to deal with North Korea. A good barometer of the mood here is the report issued in May by the Council on Foreign Relations' Korea Task Force. The report spends most of its 50 pages stressing the importance of coalition building and outlining potential sticks to use against North Korea, with almost no discussion of potential carrots. No one seems willing to answer concretely what the world is prepared to offer if North Korea discards its nuclear program. At present, it is not clear the North will get anything unless it meets a host of other conditions, ranging from conventional force reductions to coming clean on other abductions allegations. There is a growing sense among many Korea watchers in Washington that a serious confrontation between Pyongyang and Washington could come by the fall---before North Korea can finish reprocessing the 8000 spent fuel rods and before the American presidential election campaign kicks into high gear. Unlike Iraq, the war hawks will not have to rely on fabricated evidence or exaggerated claims to build a coalition (however small) and justify U.S. preemptive action---the North Korean threat is real. Just last week, Pentagon advisor Richard Perle suggested that a surgical strike on Yeongbyeon be kept on the table. One think tank analyst recently suggested that the Bush Administration may be prepared to "sacrifice Seoul to save Washington." A false choice if there ever was one. Instead of dialogue, Washington is attempting to push North Korea over the edge by imposing a virtual blockade against the North's illegal shipments abroad. Unfortunately, the Bush Administration appears to be unprepared to deal with the potential consequences of an increasingly confrontational approach. Are we really ready for an implosion or explosion in North Korea? The Bush Administration's abysmal record of nation-building in Afghanistan and Iraq suggests that they are great at winning wars, but horrible when it comes to winning the peace. Given America's vital importance to South Korea and the North's bellicosity, the Roh Administration has little choice but to accommodate Washington while at the same time continuing to reach out to Pyongyang in hopes that both sides finally come to their senses and take steps to avoid the looming train wreck. For the first time since the 1997 financial crisis, I am reminded of my favorite proverb, "Even if the sky comes crashing down, there is a hole which we can pass through." The challenge in the coming weeks will be to find that hole. |
